People are asking the wrong questions about abortion.
To determine whether a fetus has rights, the questions we must answer are not “When does life begin?” or “Is a fetus a human being?” Rather, the questions are:
What are rights?
Where do they come from?
How do we know it?
To whom do rights apply?
If you can answer these questions soundly—with evidence to support your answers—you can know whether a fetus has rights. If you can’t, you can’t. Indeed, if you can’t answer these questions soundly, you can’t know whether anyone has rights.
Rights are moral principles specifying a person’s proper freedom of action in a social context. The right to life, for instance, is the moral prerogative to take all the actions necessary to live as a human being (rather than as a serf, slave, or servant of the state). The right to liberty is the moral prerogative to act in accordance with one’s own judgment, free from coercion by others (including groups and governments). And the right to the pursuit of happiness is the moral prerogative to choose and pursue the goals and values that will fill one’s life with meaning and joy.
Rights do not come from “God.” And that’s a good thing. There is no evidence for the existence of God and thus no reason to believe in him, much less to believe that rights somehow emanate from his will. This is why religions demand that you accept God’s existence on faith—that is, in the absence of evidence to support it. But faith is not a means of knowledge. And to claim that it is a means of knowledge is to claim that just believing something to be true makes it so, which is absurd. (For more on this, see “Reason vs. Mysticism: Truth and Consequences,” TOS, Winter 2021).
Nor do rights come from governments. As the American founders observed, governments are properly formed to protect rights, not to create them. Governments create laws, but laws and rights are not the same thing. The purpose of the concept “law” is to identify that which a given government, whether legitimate or illegitimate, forbids you to do (e.g., to assault someone) or forces you to do (e.g., to pay taxes) or permits you to do (e.g., to speak your mind). The purpose of the concept “rights” is to specify the kinds of actions that you have a moral prerogative to take regardless of what governments or laws say (e.g., the moral prerogative to defend yourself or to speak your mind). The concept “rights” informs governments and lawmakers about the kinds of laws they morally may and may not make. (For more on this, see “Ayn Rand’s Theory of Rights: The Moral Foundation of a Free Society,” TOS, Fall 2011).
Nor do rights arise from the mere fact that something is alive or human. Many things that are alive do not have rights (e.g., worms, trees, tuna), and some things that are human do not have rights (e.g., murderers, dictators, and human DNA).
A person has rights by virtue of the fact that (a) he lives in a social context and thus needs freedom from physical force so that he can act in accordance with his rational judgment and thus live fully as a human being; and (b) he has not forfeited his rights (fully or partially) by initiating physical force against other people.
Rights come from perceptual observation, conceptual integration, and the use of logic. We observe that human beings are rational animals—that their rational faculty is their basic means of living—and that in order to live and thrive they must be free to act on their rational judgment. We observe that the only way that a person (or group or government) can stop someone from acting on his rational judgment is by using physical force against him. We conceptualize such facts and form observation-based, logical principles, such as: In order to live fully as a human being, a person must be free from physical force. And: Initiating physical force against a human being is morally wrong because it stops him from acting on his means of living: his rational judgment. And so on.
Through such a process of reasoning, we come to see that rights apply only to individuated human beings who live in a social context—because only they require freedom from force in order to use their minds and act on their judgment. We come to see that this is the context in which—and for which—the concept of “rights” was formed and makes sense. And we come to see that this is why a woman has a right to her body and to use and dispose of the contents of her body, including a fetus, as she sees fit.
A woman’s right to abort a fetus is an instance of her rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Her life—including her mind, body, and all of its contents—belongs to her, not to the state, not to “God,” not to a fetus, and not to anyone else.
Her liberty is the social condition necessary for her to act in accordance with her judgment, free from coercion—including coercion that would force her to carry a fetus to term or give birth to a child against her will.
Her pursuit of happiness is the moral purpose of her life—so, she should design the life she wants and pursue it relentlessly. If having a baby will make her happy given the full context of her life-serving values, she should pursue that goal. If not, she should not. If she becomes pregnant and does not want to give birth to a child, she should seek an abortion—because, in that context, given her values, that is the morally right thing to do.
Like a woman—and unlike a fetus—a newborn human baby is individuated, he is in a social context, and thus he has rights. His brain, body, and mind are insufficiently developed to exercise his rights on his own, so his rights are held in trust and exercised by his parents (or guardians) until he is sufficiently developed to exercise them himself. This development happens gradually, over years, and Western societies properly recognize this fact and have formulated various principles and laws to govern the ways in which parents and children may and may not act or interact.
A fetus, by contrast, does not have rights—because it does not meet the basic requirements for having rights: It is not individuated; it is a part of its mother. It is not in a social context; it is inside its mother. It simply does not exist in the context in which rights apply.
If someone wants to argue that a fetus has rights, the onus is on him to present evidence and logic in support of his claim. “I feel that a fetus has rights,” or “God gave a fetus rights,” or the like is not an argument.
That said, although a fetus does not have rights, it clearly is a special kind of being—especially to a woman who wants to carry it to term and give birth to a child. Laws against killing a fetus without the express consent of the woman in which it exists are both valid and vital. And killing the fetus without the woman’s consent should be treated as a crime akin to manslaughter or murder.
For a deeper and more fleshed-out understanding of what rights are, where they come from, and how we know it, see “Ayn Rand’s Theory of Rights” and “Why Religious Conservatives Should Embrace Secular Rights” (TOS, Summer 2016). For further discussion of why rights apply to women but not to fetuses, see “The Assault on Abortion Rights Undermines All Our Liberties” (TOS, Winter 2011).
A fetus is not "a part of the mother." A lung or a leg is "part" of a person's body. A fetus is a formed human entity which is _attached_ to the mother via a placenta cord in the same way a bicycle is attached to a car via a bicycle rack. Rand _never_ argued for abortion after the third month. She _always_ referred to abortion as a procedure appropriate only to an embryo or "a clump of cells." Consider: ". . . not the "rights" of the non-existent, or an embyro or a cell that is not as yet a human being [1980 Schwartz interview]. A _fetus_ after five months is a fully formed _actual_ human being. What AR actually said and what the facts of biology are must be stated correctly before asking: Does a seven month old fetus have rights?